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Construction Law

by Brian J. Morrissey*
and
Matthew W. Wallace**

Transactions within the construction industry are becoming increasingly complex as lawyers are required to consider intricate questions concerning such diverse areas as lender liability, insurance, and environmental law, along with the more traditional tort and contract principles. The
recent economic downturn in the construction industry has changed the
nature of the relationships between contractor, subcontractor, and developer, complicating the lawyer's task. This economic downturn has also
sharpened the conflict in the Georgia Court of Appeals between age-old
principles of contract and banking law and newer principles that may
better reflect the increasingly complex legal environment. For example,
Georgia courts have traditionally been willing to protect banks from
lender liability claims, but this traditional immunity is at odds with the
banks' willingness to become an active participant in the supervision of a
construction project. Also, the courts are continuing to wrestle with exactly what role arbitration should play in the construction industry. The
courts must decide whether to allow parties to choose binding arbitration
and avoid the expenses and delays associated with litigation, or to so
hamstring arbitral awards that they become nothing more than a precursor to a full-blown trial on the merits.

* Senior Associate in the firm of Brock &Clay, P.C., Marietta, Georgia. Davidson College
(B.A., 1978); University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill (J.D., with honors, 1981). Member,
State Bars of Georgia and Florida.
** Associate in the firm of Middleton & Anderson, Savannah and Atlanta, Georgia. University of Texas at Arlington (B.A., cum laude, 1986); Vanderbilt University (M.A., 1987);
Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1991). Member, Mercer Law Review
(1989-1991). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
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I. LENDER LIABmITY

A.

Disbursement of Loan Proceeds

An area of increasing interest is the role played by financial institutions
that make construction loans. Typically, a lender has no liability beyond
its contractual responsibilities to the parties with which it contracted.
This approach prevailed during the survey period. In Equitable Mortgage
Resources, Inc. v. Carter,1 defendant, Equitable Mortgage Resources,
Inc., ("Equitable") made a loan to a developer for the construction of two
houses. The developer hired a general contractor who, in turn, subcontracted some of the work to plaintiff, Lawrence J. Carter, d/b/a Lawrence
J. Carter Construction Company ("Carter"). The loan was evidenced by a
promissory note and a construction loan agreement. The loan was secured
by a deed to secure debt and a security agreement. Under these agreements, Equitable disbursed loan proceeds to the developer, who in turn
disbursed proceeds to the general contractor. However, the general contractor never paid Carter for the work it performed.'
Carter failed to perfect a materialmen's lien against the property and
did not inform Equitable that it had not been paid.3 The developer subsequently defaulted on the loan and Equitable foreclosed on the property.
Carter filed suit against the developer and the general contractor for
fraud and breach of contract. Carter later added Equitable as a defendant, alleging unjust enrichment, negligent disbursement of loan proceeds,
and seeking equitable enforcement of its "lien" and equitable remedies to
set aside the foreclosure sale.'
The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Equitable on all
of Carter's lien and contract claims.5 The court declined, however, to
grant summary judgment on the fraud and tort claims against Equitable.
After a renewed motion for summary judgment, the court of appeals
granted Equitable permission to appeal. The court of appeals, relying on
1. 199 Ga. App. 866, 406 S.E.2d 494 (1991).
2. Id. at 866, 406 S.E.2d at 495.
3. Id. Even if Carter's lien had been perfected, this lien would have been subordinate to
Equitable's security interest in the property.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 866-67, 406 S.E.2d at 495. Georgia courts do not recognize any equitable rights
in favor of parties who fail to perfect their mechanic's or materialmen's liens. Sundance, Inc.
v. Guy, 174 Ga. App. 792, 331 S.E.2d 102 (1985); P.P.G. Indus., Inc. v. Hayes Constr. Co.,
162 Ga. App. 151, 290 S.E.2d 347 (1982). This principal was most recently reaffirmed by the
Georgia Supreme Court in Clover Cable, Inc. v. Haywood, 260 Ga. 341, 392 S.E.2d 855
(1990).
6. 199 Ga. App. at 867, 406 S.E.2d at 495-96.
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Light v. Equitable Mortgage Resources,7 reversed the denial of Equitable's motion for summary judgment on the fraud and tort claims, holding:
"A construction lender has no duty to protect the subcontractors from
the risks of doing business with its borrower or to supervise the borrower's disbursement of the advances and control the funds for the benefit of the subcontractors. Similarly, where [Equitable] undertook no duties for the benefit of'the appellants here, [Equitable] owed ... no duty
with regard to the disbursements of the construction loan proceeds. The
contractual provision giving [Equitable] the right to inspect and withhold advances if it was not satisfied with the progress of construction
inured to the benefit of [Equitable], and any failure of [Equitable] to
exercise that contractual right provided the appellants no basis for complaint. Accordingly, the appellants have no claim against [Equitable] for
negligent disbursement of the loan funds."
This area may be subject to considerable change over the next several
years as Georgia appellate courts are confronted with lenders who, in a
weak construction market, step in and take a more active role in project
supervision. The results of cases involving lender liability claims spawned
during the current recession may indicate how courts will treat lenders
who actively supervise construction projects.
B. Fraud
Similarly, in Metmor Financial,Inc. v. Jenkins,9 the court did not find
a duty extending from the lender to the borrower on a purchase money
mortgage. Metmor Financial, Inc. provided mortgage financing to Julius
R. Jenkins, Jr. for the purchase of a home. After the closing, Jenkins inspected the property and noted that construction had not been completed, whereupon Jenkins defaulted on the loan. Metmor instituted foreclosure proceedings. Jenkins sued, alleging that before the closing
Metmor's employees had fraudulently misrepresented that construction
of the house had been completed."0
The trial court denied Metmor's motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, but did certify the question whether the complaint established as a
matter of law that Jenkins failed to exercise due diligence in ascertaining
7. 191 Ga. App. 816, 383 S.E.2d 142 (1989).
8. 199 Ga. App. at 867, 406 S.E.2d at 496 (quoting Light v. Equitable Mortgage Resources, 191 Ga. App. at 817, 383 S.E.2d at 143-44) (brackets in original). In essence, the
court found that Equitable's contract with the developer did not create any rights in third
parties in either contract or tort. The court rejected the conspiracy and fraud claim as well,
noting that Equitable was authorized under the note and deed to secure debt to make advances and to foreclose on the property. Id.
9. 199 Ga. App. 886, 406 S.E.2d 288 (1991).

10. Id. at 885-86, 406 S.E.2d at 288.
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the condition of the home prior to closing. The court of appeals granted
Metmor's application for an interlocutory appeal." The court held that
the purchaser of real property has a duty to discover obvious defects in
the property and concluded that a cursory visual inspection of this property would have revealed the construction deficiencies of which Jenkins
complained. 2 In other words, the reliance element of fraud is governed by
what is reasonably discoverable.
II.

A.

CONTRACT FORMATION, CONSTRUCTION, AND BREACH

Contract Formation

Oral Contracts. In Joe N. Guy Co. v. Valiant Steel & Equipment,
Inc.," M & M Specialties, Inc., ("M&M") a steel fabricator, no longer
had sufficient credit available to purchase steel from Valiant Steel &
Equipment ("Valiant Steel") for use in its construction projects on which
Joe N. Guy was the general contractor. Valiant Steel's treasurer allegedly
came to an agreement with Joe N. Guy's vice president, whereby M & M
would place purchase orders identified to the specific projects involved
with Valiant Steel on Joe N. Guy's behalf and Valiant Steel would invoice
Joe N. Guy for the shipments. There was no written contract memorializing this arrangement."4 Valiant Steel made thirty shipments of steel and
mailed invoices for the shipments directly to Joe N. Guy during the three
month period following the first shipment. Joe N. Guy paid more than
$297,000 without objection, then ceased paying. Valiant Steel sued. 16
Valiant Steel obtained a verdict and judgment against Joe N. Guy. Joe
N. Guy claimed, in part, that Valiant Steel did not make out a prima
facie case that a contract existed.'8 The court of appeals disagreed, finding that the written confirmations in the form of letterhead invoices sent
by Valiant Steel to Joe N. Guy constituted evidence of the oral
agreement."
Contradictory Terms. A different set of issues arises when a contract is contradictory in its terms. In Crook v. West," builders W. Tony
11. Id. at 886, 406 S.E.2d at 288.
12. Id.,, 406 S.E.2d at 289. Typically,

there is no confidential relationship between a
lender and a borrower, and consequently, no right to rely blindly on representations by the
lender. Pardue v. Bankers First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 175 Ga. App. 814, 334 S.E.2d 926

(1985).
13.

196 Ga. App. 20, 395 S.E.2d 310 (1990).

14. Id. at 20, 395 S.E.2d at 311.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 21, 395 S.E.2d at 311.
Id.
Id. at 21-22, 395 S.E.2d at 311-12.
196 Ga. App. 4, 395 S.E.2d 260 (1990).
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Crook and TAC Builders, Inc. sued the purchaser of a residential building
for breach of a contract to purchase. The purchasers counterclaimed to
recover their earnest money deposit. At trial, the jury found the existence
of a valid contract between the parties but a breach of that contract on
the part of the builders. The dispute centered on the purchase price of
the property; the builder's contention was that the evidence at trial did
the jury's verdict in favor of the purchasers concerning the
not support
19
price.
The contract provided: "The purchase price of said property shall be
. . .$125,900.00 . . .," but immediately preceding this language in the

contract was a provision that the purchase price was subject to modification prior to closing. 0 The contract further provided that "[t]he final
purchase price will be determined by the actual construction costs of the
building, including land and all documented related construction costs,
.. plus 20% of this total cost figure. 2' The builder alleged that the
actual construction costs were $160,000, and so, according to the contract,
the purchase price on a cost-plus basis would be approximately $192,000.
The purchasers admitted the price was subject to some fluctuation based
upon the price of materials but contended that the size of the disparity
claimed by the builders was beyond what was contemplated by the parto close for $125,900 and not the
ties. The purchasers were only willing
22
higher price sought by the builders.
The court of appeals held that, even though the price was subject to
fluctuation, the jury was authorized to find that the purchase price provisions were not consistent, given the more than fifty percent discrepancy
between the fixed price amount and the cost-plus amount ultimately
sought by the builders.2 3 In essence, the court decided that the size of the
discrepancy was beyond the meeting of the minds as evidenced by the
contract. The contract contemplated minor deviations that would allow
for cost increases or decreases in materials and labor, however, the contract provisions would not allow a material change to the contract. Accordingly, the contractor's change in price was beyond the scope of the
agreement made by the purchasers and, therefore, unenforceable.
*

Waiver of Written Terms. The parties to a construction contract
may waive any of the written provisions by their conduct. For example, in
19. Id. at 4, 395 S.E.2d at 261.

20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.

23. Id. The court rested its decision on the principle of contract construction that the
first of two contradictory contract clauses will prevail. Joseph Camacho Ass'n v. Millard, 169
Ga. App. 937, 315 S.E.2d 478 (1984).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

Consolidated Federal Corp. v. Cain, 4 plaintiff Consolidated Federal
Corp. and defendants Frank and Eudene Cain entered into a written construction agreement for the construction of a house. Plaintiff brought
suit, alleging that defendants failed to deliver the house for the price
agreed upon in the contract and sought specific performance or, alternatively, damages for breach of contract. Defendants counterclaimed, contending plaintiff owed them additional sums for labor, material, and services performed.2
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants in the full
amount of additional compensation sought, conditioned upon defendants'
conveyance of the property to the plaintiff. The trial court denied plaintiff's motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict or alternatively for
new trial, and plaintiff appealed. 6
The construction agreement required all change orders to be in writing
and signed by both parties to the contract. At trial, however, the court
permitted the defendants to present evidence of oral instructions from
plaintiff to make changes and modifications to the house while it was
under construction, which resulted in additional construction costs.2 The
court reiterated the prevailing standard:
"that the provisions of a building contract requiring a written change
order before beginning work for which recovery is sought are valid and
binding provisions. However, where the parties by a course of conduct

have departed from the terms of the contract and operated without prior
written change orders, there may be a waiver, or oral variation of the
provisions of the contract."'
To establish such a deviation, then, a party must show no prior use of
written change orders on the job and a deviation from the specific terms
of the contract by the course of conduct of the parties.
It is unclear what result would obtain if a single written change order
had been used, but all subsequent changes were done orally. The language of the court of appeals decision suggests that such an instance
would not engender a waiver of a party's right to insist that written
change orders be employed, even if that party orally instructed another to
perform changes.
24. 195 Ga. App. 671, 394 S.E.2d 605 (1990).
25. Id. at 671-72, 394 S.E.2d at 605.

26. Id. at 672, 394 S.E.2d at 606.
27. Id.
28. Id., 394 S.E.2d at 606-07 (quoting Daniel & Daniel, Inc. v. Stewart Bros., 139 Ga.
App. 372, 228 S.E.2d 586 (1976)).
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B. Contract Construction
Statutes of Limitation and Repose. In Fort Oglethorpe Associates
II v. Hails Construction Co., 9 a shopping center owner brought an action
for breach of contract and breach of warranty against a general contractor
and for negligent construction against the general contractor and its roofing subcontractor. The trial court granted summary judgment to defendants on all claims. The shopping center owner appealed.80 The construction project was substantially completed on December 12, 1979. Plaintiff's
complaint was filed on June 27, 1986, more than six years after the limitations period commenced." Accordingly, the statute of limitations barred
the contract claims82 The court of appeals further determined that the
statute of limitations barred the warranty claims because of the six-year
statutory limitation and the one-year limitation found within the agree3
ment itself.8

The court clarified the law as to when the limitations period begins to
run. The department store over which the roof was constructed was a
separate and identifiable portion of the shopping center project as a
whole and was constructed under a separate set of specifications. As a
result, the date on which the department store was occupied, which was
prior to the date of substantial completion of the entire shopping center
project, controlled the warranty provisions of the contract. Since the department store was completely separate from the entire project, the court
rejected the shopping center owner's argument that occupancy of the en4
tire shopping center was the important date for limitations purposes.3
With respect to the negligence claims, the shopping center owner argued that even though he brought the action more than four years after
substantial completion, Georgia's statute of repose" saved the action be29. 196 Ga. App. 663, 396 S.E.2d 585 (1990).
30. Id. at 663, 396 S.E.2d at 586.
31. Id. at 664, 396 S.E.2d at 586. A claim on a written contract must be brought within
six years after the contract becomes due and payable. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24 (1982). A construction contract is considered "due and payable" at the time of substantial completion. 196 Ga.
App. at 663, 396 S.E.2d at 586.
32. 196 Ga. App. at 664, 396 S.E.2d at 586.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. The statute of repose provides:
No action to recover damages:
(1) For any deficiency in the survey or plat, planning, design, specifications,
supervision or observation of construction, or construction of an improvement to real property...

shall be brought against any person performing or furnishing the survey or plat,
design, planning, supervision or observation of construction, or construction of

148
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cause it was brought within eight years of substantial completion. 6 The
court rejected the argument, claiming that the statute of repose applies
only to personal injury, not property damage.37 Accordingly, in Georgia,
actions for property damage must be brought within four years of the
substantial completion date. Moreover, the court found that the statute
of repose was not intended to extend the otherwise8 applicable periods of
limitation, whether they be two, four, or six years.
Apparent Authority. In Hunter v. Roberts,8 ' plaintiff Isaiah Hunter,
d/b/a Hunter Grading Contractors ("Hunter"), sued Terry Roberts, d/b/a
T.S. Roberts and Son, Inc. ("Roberts"), over a construction contract for
blasting work. Hunter alleged that Roberts ceased work on the project
well before completion. The trial court granted defendant's motion for
summary judgment on the basis that one of Hunter's employees executed
a release in favor of defendant Roberts. 40 The release was a handwritten,
undated document which read: "As of 1/16/87 Drilling Services div [sic]
of T.S. Roberts & Sons, Inc., is released from contract dated Nov - to
do drilling & blasting on Gwinnett Co Airport box culvert.' 1 The release
was signed by the employee as Vice President of Hunter Grading.'2
Hunter produced evidence showing that the employee was not a vice
president and had no authority to enter into contracts or release others
from contracts on behalf of the plaintiff. Hunter further testified that
during the entire project he never introduced his employee as a vice president of the company.48
Roberts introduced evidence that he relied upon the release signed by
the employee as vice president." The president of Controlled Blasting,
the company hired by the employee of Hunter to complete the work defendant had contracted to do, testified that the employee led him to believe that he was the vice president of Hunter Grading and, therefore,
authorized to enter into contracts on behalf of the company. Indeed, this
employee signed the contract between plaintiff and Controlled Blasting as
such an improvement more than eight years after substantial completion of such
an improvement.
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-51(a)(1) (1982).

36. 196 Ga. App. at 664-65, 396 S.E.2d at 587.
37. Id.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 665, 396 S.E.2d at 587.
199 Ga. App. 318, 404 S.E.2d 645 (1991).
Id. at 318, 404 S.E.2d at 646.
Id., 404 S.E.2d at 647.

42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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the Vice President of Hunter Grading.4 5 Defendant further testified that
Hunter introduced the employee as vice president and told Roberts to
deal with this employee on the project and that the employee had full
authority to administer the project.' 6 Based upon this testimony, the
court of appeals correctly concluded that a question of fact remained conand recerning the authority of the employee to bind plaintiff Hunter
47
defendant.
of
favor
in
granted
judgment
summary
the
versed
The formalities surrounding authority to act on behalf of corporations
or to act as an agent for a principal often become relaxed on construction
projects. This leads to numerous problems, such as the one outlined
above in which an employee of a contractor may have waived his employer's rights to enforce a contract against a defaulting subcontractor. It
is best to clearly spell out the authority of administrators on a project site
so that no confusion results from an employee who oversteps his
authority.'
C. Breach and Remedies
Unjust Enrichment and Implied Contract. In construction law
claims, contractors or purchasers are not limited to simple breach of contract claims; they can also pursue recovery ex contractu or by implied
contract. Such was the case in Smith Development, Inc. v. Flood,' where
Smith Development, Inc. ("Smith Development") sued Flood for quantum meruit and unjust enrichment. Dyer contacted plaintiff to construct
a house on land then being offered for sale by Flood and Boling, a third
party. The landowner and Dyer never arranged a purchase price, nor did
they execute a written contract. Furthermore, Boling informed plaintiff
that he was not the sole owner of the lot and could not sell it.50
In October 1988, Boling visited the lot with a prospective buyer and
discovered that someone was building a house on it. At that time, the
foundation, subflooring, and septic tank were in place. Boling contacted
Flood, who was also unaware that any building was being constructed on
the property.' Boling conveyed his interest to Flood and Flood contacted
Smith Development, notifying Smith Development that there was no
agreement to purchase the land and that there should be no construction
45. Id.
46. Id.
47.

Id.

48.

As an example of some of the complications that may arise from ambiguity created

by the parties to a construction contract, see generally Clover Cable, Inc. v. Haywood, 260

Ga. 341, 392 S.E.2d 855 (1990).
49.

198 Ga. App. 817, 403 S.E.2d 249 (1991).

50. Id. at 817, 403 S.E.2d at 250.
51. Neither joint owner had given anyone permission to build.
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on the property until they settled the matter of purchase. Despite numerous warnings, plaintiff continued construction and the house was substantially completed on November 17, 1989. Smith Development filed suit.5'
The trial court concluded that the house was approximately fifty percent completed before Boling discovered it and that Flood notified plaintiff to cease construction until the purchase of the property was worked
out. The court found that the fair market value of the land itself was
$16,000 and that the house built upon it had a reasonable value to the
plaintiff of $40,400."
The court concluded that Flood could not be compelled to accept any
services from a contractor the existence of whom she was unaware." An
acceptance, therefore, would have to be found by virtue of the parties'
conduct after defendant became aware of construction on the property. In
this case, conduct showed that defendant was explicit in demanding that
construction cease." At best, plaintiff voluntarily commenced construction and did not provide any benefit to defendant. Defendant did not
voluntarily accept the benefit of the construction, and, as a result, no
promise to pay can be presumed or implied." The court also rejected the
argument that the subsequent use of the house by the defendant created
an obligation to pay, stating,
"[wihenever a structure is permanently affixed to real property belonging
to an individual, without his consent or request, he cannot be held responsible because of its subsequent use. It becomes his by being annexed
to the soil; and he is not obliged to remove it to escape liability. He is not
deemed to have accepted it so as to incur an obligation to pay for it,
merely because he has not chosen to tear it down, but has seen fit to use
it."115

While seemingly harsh in effect, this principle places the risk squarely on
the party best situated to prevent its occurrence, even at the price of a
windfall to another.
Conditions Precedent. Although breach of contract by one party
may excuse performance by the other, such a breach need not excuse performance of an independent, albeit related, obligation. In S & W Masonry Contractor,Inc. v. Jamison Co.,"1 the court of appeals reversed the
trial court's denial of plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on a
52. 198 Ga. App. at 817-18, 403 S.E.2d at 250-51.
53. Id. at 818, 403 S.E.2d at 251.
54. Id. at 819, 403 S.E.2d at 252.
55. Id. at 819-21, 403 S.E.2d at 251-52.
56. Id.

57. Id. at 821, 403 S.E.2d at 253 (quoting Sutton v. United States, 256 U.S. 575 (1921)).
58. 199 Ga. App. 628, 405 S.E.2d 519 (1991).
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$10,000 promissory note. Plaintiff, S & W Masonry Contractor, Inc. ("S &
W Masonry"), instituted the action against defendant, Jamison Company,
for the collection of the $10,000 promissory note. Defendant denied liability because plaintiff failed to perform its construction services satisfactorily." The court rejected as irrelevant to defendant's obligation to make
payment under the note defendant's contention that a genuine issue of
material fact existed concerning whether there was failure of consideration resulting from substandard performance on the part of plaintiff."
Measure of Damages for Defective Workmanship. In Sanders
v. Robertson," purchasers of a home sued the general contractor and architect for negligent design and construction. Plaintiff contended that defendants' negligence necessitated structural repairs to the home and payment of additional engineering consulting fees, interest and closing costs
on loans made to pay for the structural repairs, and additional interest
paid as a result of delays. 2 The court stated that the measure of damages
for the correction of substandard work is the amount necessary to repair
the defective workmanship. 3 The court also held that for delay in the
performance of a contract, the damages are usually for the loss of the use
of the property involved."
Damages for Delays. In Empire Shoe Co. v. Niko Industries,Inc.,"
a corporate commercial tenant brought an action against his landlord for
damages resulting from delays in renovation of a building. The tenant
allegedly lost profits as a result of the landlord's renovation." The court
held that although anticipated profits were too speculative to be recovered, when a business has been established, such damages may be recoverable.87 These damages for lost profits are recoverable, however, only if
the business has a proven track record of profitability and not when there
is a track record of loss." The court of appeals determined that since the
59. Id. at 628, 405 S.E.2d at 520.
60. Id. at 629, 405 S.E.2d at 520. An example of a case in which the obligations arose in
the same contract is Dixie Roof Decks, Inc. v. Borggren/Dickson Constr., Inc., 195 Ga. App.
881, 395 S.E.2d 19 (1990), in which a roofing subcontractor brought suit to recover retainage
held under the construction contract in payment for certain extra work performed. The

construction contract contained an express condition precedent to payment that the roofing
subcontractor deliver a roof warranty to the general contractor. Id.
61.
62.

196 Ga. App. 739, 397 S.E.2d 26 (1990).
Id. at 739, 397 S.E.2d at 27.

63.
64.
65.
.66.
67.
68.

Id.
Id.
197 Ga. App. 411, 398 S.E.2d 440 (1990).
Id. at 411, 398 S.E.2d at 441.
Id. at 413-14, 398 S.E.2d at 442-43.
Id. at 414, 398 S.E.2d at 443.
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tenant had no track record of profitability, the trial court correctly denied
its right to recover such damages."
Damages for Successful Bid Protest. In City of Atlanta v.J.A.
Jones Construction Co., 70 the Georgia Supreme Court held that the unsuccessful or frustrated bidder for a public construction contract could
only recover the reasonable costs of bid preparation and was not entitled
to lost profits' 1 In Jones the City of Atlanta advertised for bids on the
construction of a parking deck at Hartsfield International Airport. The
City established a deadline for the submission of bids at 2:00 p.m., April
10, 1985. While Jones' bid was the lowest one submitted on time, the
contract was awarded to Interstate Construction, which had submitted a
lower bid three minutes after the deadline. Jones sued the city on two
counts, seeking lost profits in a state law contract claim, and further damages under 42 United States Code section 1983 ("section 1983")"2 for an
alleged denial of due process." A jury in Fulton County Superior Court
awarded Jones $522,125.05 on the state law claim and $375,000 on the
section 1983 claim." The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's
verdict.'
The City of Atlanta appealed, claiming that in the event of a wrongful
award of the bid, the amount of damages should be merely the reasonable
costs of bid preparation, and that any recovery allowed under section
1983 constituted an impermissible double recovery for the plaintiff." The
Georgia Supreme Court agreed, reversing the court of appeals." The
court stated, "In order to determine whether the damages awarded were
' 78
correct, we must first look at the purpose of the bid requirement." Jus-

tice Benham went on to state that "the bid process for public projects
was designed to protect the public coffers from waste and to assure that
taxpayers receive quality work and goods for the lowest possible price. ' ' 8
Moreover, if "a governmental entity has frustrated the bid process and
awarded the contract to an unqualified bidder, the injured low bidder
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
260 Ga. 658, 398 S.E.2d 369 (1990).
Id. at 659, 398 S.E.2d at 370-71.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).

73. 260 Ga. at 658, 398 S.E.2d at 370. Jones alleged that its due process rights were
denied because of the city's failure to conduct a hearing to consider Jones' complaint regarding the consideration of the late bid. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.; City of Atlanta v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 195 Ga. App. 72, 392 S.E.2d 564, reu'd,
260 Ga. 658, 398 S.E.2d 369 (1990).
76. 260 Ga. at 658-59, 398 S.E.2d at 370-71.
77. Id. at 659, 398 S.E.2d at 371.
78. Id. at 658, 398 S.E.2d at 370.

79. Id.
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may bring an action for appropriate relief." 80 The damages are limited,
however, to the "reasonable cost of bid preparations." 1 The court also
noted that to allow
the recovery of lost profits would unduly punish the tax-paying public
while compensating the plaintiffs for effort they did not make and risks
they did not take. Limiting recovery to reasonable bid preparation costs
is in keeping with the legitimate governmental objective of rewarding the
lowest qualified bidder and guarding against public officials shirking
their duties while, at the same time, preventing unwarranted waste of
tax-payers' money."
The Georgia Supreme Court also rejected Jones' section 1983 claim as
an "impermissible double recovery." 83 The court noted that the basis of
the section 1983 claim was the City of Atlanta's failure to afford Jones
Construction a hearing at which they could contest the award of the contract to another bidder.8 ' The court also held that there could be no additional recovery beyond that of the bid preparation costs because the "abstract value of a constitutional right may not for the basis of section 1983
damages .. . [S]uch damages must always be designed 'to compensate
injuries caused by the constitutional deprivation.' "85 Accordingly, the
court concluded that Jones could not recover any damages resulting from
a wrongful bid award under section 1983.8
III.

TORT LIABILITY

Tort liability is one of the fastest growing areas in the construction law
field as parties increasingly seek alternative means of securing payment
for services performed or recovery for damages incurred by breaches of
contract. Thus, prudence dictates that when considering a claim involving
a construction site, one should carefully investigate tort remedies as a
supplement to rights existing under construction contracts.
80. Id. at 659, 398 SXE.2d at 370 (citing Hilton Constr. Co. v. Rockdale County Bd., 245
Ga. 533, 266. S.E.2d 157 (1980)).
81. Id., 398 S.E.2d at 371.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84.

Id.

85. Id. (quoting Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308-09

(1986)).
86. Id.
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Privity in Professional Negligence

In Southeast Consultants, Inc. v. O'Pry,'" O'Pry sued Brunner and
Southeast Consultants, Inc., engineering and land surveyors who were
subcontractors on the construction of O'Pry's new house. The basis of the
action was negligence in the performance of certain percolation tests prior
to installation of a septic tank. At trial, the jury rendered a verdict in
favor of plaintiff, from which defendants appealed. 8
Defendants argued that since they were subcontractors, plaintiff had no
standing to sue because he did not have direct contractual privity with
them." In rejecting that argument, the court of appeals held that privity
was not necessary as the basis of a suit founded in negligence." The court
stated:
One who in the course of his business, profession or employment supplies
false information is subject to liability for damages caused by others' justifiable reliance upon the information, where he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in providing the information, and where the loss
is suffered by one for whose benefit he supplies the information or knows
that the recipient intends to supply it, and whom he intends the information to influence or knows that the recipient so intends."1
Because the engineers knew that prospective purchasers would rely on
their report concerning percolation, lack of privity could not shield them
from liability to foreseeable prospective purchasers. Prospective purchasers of the house were exactly the type of persons whom the defendants
could foresee would be directly injured as a result of their negligence;
thus, defendants owed a duty to the plaintiff.""
Interestingly, the decision in Southeast Consultants is at odds with last
year's decision in Wood Brothers Construction Co. v. Simons-Eastern
Co.,9" in which the court of appeals reiterated that privity between a design professional and a third party was necessary in order for the third
party to sue on its legal duty to exercise reasonable care in the performance of a contract." The distinguishing feature between Wood Brothers
Construction and Southeast Consultants is the difference between a vertical relationship and a horizontal relationship. In other words, in SouthI

87. ' 199 Ga. App. 125, 404 S.E.2d 299 (1991).
88. Id. at 125, 404 S.E.2d at 300.

89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. (citing Robert & Co. v. Rhodes-Haverty Partnership, 250 Ga. 680, 300 S.E.2d 503
(1983)).
92. Id.
93. 193 Ga. App. 874, 389 S.E.2d at 382 (1989).
94. Id. at 875-76, 389 S.E.2d at 383-84.
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east Consultants the design professionals were subcontractors of one in
direct privity with the prospective purchaser, while in Wood Brothers
Construction,the design professional was in a separate contractual chain
to the owner than the complaining third party general contractor.
B.

ContractualDuties and Tort

In Bowdish v. Johns Creek Associates," Bowdish, a home builder, purchased five building lots in a subdivision from Johns Creek Associates
("Johns Creek") for the purpose of constructing homes. A condition of
the purchase agreement was that the sale of the finished homes would be
handled through Hyde Park Realtors. After construction, plaintiff sold
none of the homes it constructed in the subdivision. Foreclosure and
money judgments against Bowdish followed. Bowdish asserted claims
against both Johns Creek and Hyde Park Realtors based on breach of
contract, negligence, and fraud."6 At trial, Bowdish argued that defendants were negligent in failing to maintain the subdivision properly, to
construct certain amenities, and to market the subdivision properly. The
fraud claim was based upon misrepresentations that the amenities and
entrance wall would be constructed. The jury returned a verdict in favor
of plaintiff. However, the trial court granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict, and plaintiff appealed.'
In affirming that portion of the judgment directing a verdict against
plaintiff on the negligence claim, the court held:
"It is well settled that misfeasance in the performance of a contractual
duty may give rise to a tort action. But in such cases the injury to the
plaintiff has been 'an independent injury over and above the mere disappointment of plaintiff's hope to receive (the) contracted-for benefit.' 'The
duty, for a breach of which an action ex delicto lies, must be a duty imposed by law as to some relationship, general or special, as applied to
that class of cases where the alleged duty arises out of a contract. For
instance, if one promises to pay another a given sum of money by a
named day, the contract creates a duty to pay; but a breach of that duty
is not a tort.'

""

The court found that while one might construe the contract between the
parties to contain implied duties on the part of defendants to extend and
devote resources for the purposes outlined by plaintiff, the evidence sim95. 200 Ga. App. 93, 406 S.E.2d 502 (1991).
96. Id. at 93, 406 S.E.2d at 503. The contract claim was resolved by the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants.
97. Id. at 93-94, 406 S.E.2d at 503-04.

98. Id. at 94, 406 S.E.2d at 504 (quoting Tate v. Aetna Casualty &Sur. Co., 149 Ga. App.
123,124-25, 253 S.E.2d 775, 777 (1979)).
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ply showed a failure to provide sufficient assets for these purposes, which,
standing alone, was a breach of a promise to allocate these sources to the
business project but was not a tort."
The court reversed the trial court's grant of directed verdict on the
fraud claim based upon representations by defendants as to when the
amenities would be constructed. 0 As it turned out, the amenities were
not constructed until after plaintiff's houses had been foreclosed and defendant Johns Creek transferred ownership of the subdivision to a third
party. Additionally, the financing required by Johns Creek did not include a provision for funds for construction of the amenities at the subdivision. Thus, there was sufficient evidence that, at the time defendant
made representations to plaintiff, defendant did not intend to perform
the promise. 101
IV.

ARBITRATION

During the survey period, the Georgia Court of Appeals, with limited
success, wrestled again with the scope, validity, and function of arbitrators in the construction industry. The courts alternate between a wellreasoned policy of insuring the success of arbitration through granting
broad scope to the arbitrators and an openly hostile attack on any arbitral award that possesses minor technical faults.
A. Awards of Interest and Attorney Fees
The hostility that courts sometimes demonstrate is apparent in Walton
Acoustics, Inc. v. Currahee Construction Co.' °5 In Currahee the court of
appeals affirmed a trial court's order vacating an arbitral award merely
because the arbitrator awarded attorney fees in his arbitral decision. In a
five to four decision, the court of appeals found that Official Code of
Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 9-9-97(a) controlled the arbitral
awards of attorney fees.10 1 Section 9-9-97(a) provides: "[U]nless otherwise
provided in the agreement to arbitrate, the arbitrators' expenses and fees,
together with other expenses, not including counsel fees, incurred in the
99. Id. at 95, 406 S.E.2d at 504.

100. Id. at 95-96, 406 S.E.2d at 505-06.
101. Id. at 96, 406 S.E.2d at 505. See Hayes v. Hallmark Apartments, 232 Ga. 307, 207
S.E.2d 197 (1974); Middlebrooks v. Lonas, 246 Ga. 720, 272 S.E.2d 687 (1980); Rogers v.
DeMonteguin, 193 Ga. App. 480, 388 S.E.2d 10 (1989); see also Clements v. Barnes, 197 Ga.
App. 120, 397 S.E.2d 560 (1990) (homeowner recovered from defendant contractor for negligent failure to install footings and breach of express or implied promises that house was
built in a fit and workmanlike manner).
102. 197 Ga. App. 659, 399 S.E.2d 265 (1990).
103. Id. at 659-60, 399 S.Eo2d at 266.
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conduct of the arbitration, shall be paid as provided in the award.""'4 The
judges discounted appellant's notion that O.C.G.A. section 13-6-1110° provided for the recovery of properly pled and proved attorney fees in an
arbitral action.101 The court chose to favor section 9-9-97 because the
Georgia legislature enacted it subsequent to passage of section 13-6-11."'
The court found further support for its holding in the plain language of
section 9-9-97(a), which allows for the "recovery of "other expenses' incurred in the conduct of the arbitration."1'
The majority then applied a strict construction argument to O.C.G.A.
section 9-9-93(b)(3)'" and vacated the entire arbitral award because of
the grant of $700 in attorney fees."" The court apparently felt bound by
the strict language of the statute, noting that the trial court does not have
"the power simply to set aside the award of attorney's fees and confirm
the remaining award. As logical as this would be, the statutory scheme
does not permit it.""' Section 9-9-93(b) states in pertinent part "[t]he
award shall be vacated . . . by: (3) an overstepping by the arbitrator of
their authority or such imperfect execution of it that a final and definite
award upon the subject matter submitted was not made." 1"? Evidently,
the judges felt that the arbitrator's award of the minimum attorney fees
had overstepped the boundaries allowed in the statute and thereby invalidated the entire arbitration process.
Judge Beasley entered a stinging dissent. 18 Beasley agreed that attorney fees are not properly awardable in arbitration actions but found it
nonsensical, by virtue of this improper award of attorney fees, to require
repetition of the entire process."" Judge Beasley noted: "It is wasteful
and serves neither justice nor any useful purpose to send a whole matter
back, for re-arbitration with a new arbitrator and new potential applications to the trial court and a new appeal, when the law is clear." '
Results such as this hamstring the usefulness of arbitration. The primary benefit of any arbitration process is that it is faster and cheaper
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-97(a) (1982).
Id. § 13-6-11 (1982 & Supp. 1991).
197 Ga. App. at 660, 399 S.E.2d at 266.
Id.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 9-9-93 (1982).

110. 197 Ga. App. at 660, 399 S.E.2d at 266.
111. Id.
112. O.C.G.A. § 9-9-93(b)(3) (1982).

113. 197 Ga. App. at 660, 399 S.E.2d at 266. Judge Beasley was joined by Judges Birdsong and Sognier. Chief Judge Carley entered a separate dissent without opinion. Id. at 660-

61, 399 S.E.2d at 266-67.
114. Id. at 660-61, 399 S.E.2d at 266-67 (Beasley, Birdsong & Sognier, JJ., dissenting).
115. Id. at 661, 399 S.E.2d at 267 (Beasley, Birdsong & Sognier, JJ., dissenting).
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than resorting to the state or federal court system. The value of the arbitral process is contingent upon the simple requirement that at the end of
the arbitral day, a valid binding award can be issued. If each and every
award is subject to appeal and vacation on minor procedural grounds, as
in Currahee,the value of arbitration is at best de minimis and at most it
represents a precursor to a full trial on the merits.
B. Scope of Arbitrator's Authority
A common method of attacking an arbitral award in the courts is to
allege the arbitrator acted beyond the scope of his authority. Unlike the
stringent scrutiny it has given to the form of arbitral awards, the Georgia
Court of Appeals has taken a more liberal stance in the definition of the
scope of an arbitrator's authority. In City of College Park v. Batson-Cook
Co.,"1 6 the city appealed the refusal of the Superior Court of Fulton
County to vacate an arbitral award on the grounds that the arbitral panel
overstepped its authority in making the award. In 1984 the City of College Park and the Batson-Cook Company entered into a guaranteed maximum cost contract for the construction of a convention center to be completed in mid-1985. The contract provided further that any costs above
that amount would not be reimbursed unless an order signed by the
owner and architect authorized the additional cost.117 The parties used a
standard form agreement from The American Institute of Architects that
included a standard arbitration clause requiring "all claims and disputes
between the contractor and owner. . . be decided by arbitration."",
After the project was substantially completed, Batson-Cook submitted
a claim of $1.4 million over the guaranteed maximum cost. The architect
denied the claim and Batson-Cook filed a declaratory judgment action in
the Superior Court of Troup County claiming that the dispute was not
subject to arbitration."" At arbitration, Batson-Cook presented evidence
that the changes made were presented to the architect and the owner and
that the owner indicated that he would like to wait until the project was
completed before discussing the additional amounts. The arbitration
panel awarded Batson-Cook slightly less than the full amount claimed in
the increase, and the city appealed the award to the Superior Court of
Fulton County.12 0
116. 196 Ga. App. 138, 395 S.E.2d 385 (1990).
117. Id. at 138-39, 395 S.E.2d at 386.
118. Id. at 139, 395 S.E.2d at 386.
119. Id. (The trial court denied appellant's request for declaratory relief, concluding that
the claim was subject to arbitration. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed without

opinion.)
120. Id.
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After examination of the record, the trial court confirmed the award.
The court found the award within the range of evidence and that there
was no evidence that the arbitrator ignored the terms of the contract or
the applicable law.1"' The 'City of College Park appealed. The city
claimed that in failing to vacate the award the trial court erred because
the award was "manifestly against applicable law and the arbitrators
overstepped their authority in making the award.""12
The court of appeals affirmed. 28 The court noted that O.C.G.A. section
9-9-93(b)(3)
provides that an arbitration award shall be vacated if the court finds that
the rights of the party making the application were prejudiced by "an
overstepping by the arbitrators of their authority or such imperfect exedefinitive award upon the subject matter
cution of it that a final and
'4
submitted was not made.""1
The court ruled strongly in favor of the authority of the arbitrator noting
that" '[t]he function of the trial court in proceedings to confirm or vacate
an arbitration award should be severely limited in order not to frustrate
the purpose of avoiding litigation by resorting to arbitration.' ,,2
In discussing the proper function of the court in reviewing an arbitral
award, the Georgia Court of Appeals cited United Steel Workers v.
American Manufacturing Co.12 American Manufacturing is one of the
three most durable cases in American labor history. 12 7 Written in 1960
and commonly called the Steelworkers Trilogy these cases form the basis
of all significant decisions concerning the arbitrability of labor questions.
These decisions are the cornerstone of the effectiveness of labor arbitration, because the constant resort to appeal threatens the vitality of any
award and undermines the value of arbitration. These cases provide fertile ground for anyone defending an arbitral award. As the Supreme
Court stated, "The courts. . . have no business weighing the merits" of
121. Id.
122. Id., 395 S.E.2d at 386-87.
123. Id. at 140, 395 S.E.2d at 387.
124. Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 9-9-93(b)(3) (1982)).
125. Id. (quoting Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nunnally Lumber Co., 176 Ga. App. 232,
236, 335 S.E.2d 708, 712 (1985)).
126. 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
127. The other two cases are United Steel Workers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. 574 (1960), and United Steel Workers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593 (1960). For an extensive survey of the impact of these Supreme Court decisions upon
labor arbitration, see Russell A. Smith & Dallas L. Jones, The Impact of the Emerging
Federal Law of Grievance Arbitration on Judges, Arbiters, and Parties,52 VA. L. REv. 831
(1966); see also Bernard D. Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Arbitrability and Collective Bargaining, 28 U. CH. L. Rav. 464 (1961).
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an arbitration claim."28 The Court further noted in United States v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.1 " that an award is "legitimate only so long
as it draws its essence" from the agreement from which the arbitrator
draws his authority.8 0 While these principles only apply by analogy to
construction arbitration, the underlying purposes of speed and practical
efficiency remain the same.
Sometimes, the Georgia Court of Appeals will agree to a practical and
realistic interpretation of the scope of an arbitrator's authority. For example, in Mitchem v. Joe N. Guy Co.,18 1 the court held that a subsequent
oral agreement was subject to an arbitration clause found in the contract
that defined the relationship between the contractor and subcontractor.3 2
Mitchem, a subcontractor, operated pursuant to several written agreements with Joe N. Guy Company ("Guy"). Mitchem was unable to lease
certain hydraulic excavation equipment needed to perform the subcontract with Guy. Accordingly, Guy leased the equipment, and thereafter
loaned the equipment to Mitchem under an oral agreement pursuant to
which Guy recovered the rental costs through payment from Mitchem or
by withholding a sum from periodic payments due Mitchem under the
subcontracts.188
When underpaid, Mitchem filed a demand for arbitration with the
American Arbitration Association. Guy counterclaimed, alleging that
Mitchem had wrongfully converted the equipment and withheld it from
Guy and that the lessor of the equipment had filed suit against Guy to
recover rental payments and cost of repairs. Mitchem thereafter filed a
motion for stay of arbitration in the superior court. Mitchem asserted
that the equipment lease claim was not properly the subject of arbitration
because it was not within the contemplation of the original agreement.lu
The court of appeals properly noted that
[e]ven though Mitchem prayed for injunctive relief, his petition was in
the nature of a complaint for declaratory judgment requesting the trial
court to decide as a matter of law whether written contracts between the
parties, which were clearly subject to arbitration, permitted Guy to seek
reimbursement for the equipment leased as part of the arbitration
proceedings.' 3'
128. 363 U.S. at 568.

129. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
130.
131.
132.
133,
134.
135,

Id. at 597.
196 Ga. App. 110, 395 S.E.2d'331 (1990).
Id. at 111, 395 S.E.2d at 333.
Id. at 110, 395 S.E.2d at 332.
Id. at 110-11, 395 S.E.2d at 332.
Id. at 111 n.1, 395 S.E.2d at 332 n.l.
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Mitchem appealed the trial court's denial of the motion for stay of arbitration.18 6 Mitchem argued that the agreement concerning the equivalent
lease was not subject to arbitration because it was oral and did not otherwise comply with the statutory requirement of subjecting an agreement to
arbitration.1 78
The court quickly dispensed with this notion, observing that "each of
the written subcontracts contained a provision whereby the contractor
may pay for expenses of labor, materials or supplies used by the subcontractor in the work and charge the cost to the subcontractor if the subcontractor fails to pay for such expenses."
The court considered the
rental charges a debt for supplies or equipment owed to the general contractor, and therefore subject to the arbitration clause.",9 This led the
court to conclude that "the trial court did not err in denying Mitchem's
prayer for relief because, as a matter law, the amount owed under the
rental agreement was arbitrable because it relates to the amount of
1' 40
money owed by one party to the other under the written agreements.
V. MECHANICS' AND MATERIALMEN'S LIENS
In Georgia, a mechanics' lien is a statutory lien on real property that
represents security for payment of labor or materials provided in the construction or rehabilitation of the property. 41 The lien establishes an interest in land and, ultimately, a right to sell the property to which the
lien attaches if the debt is not paid.142 The procedure for establishing a
binding materialmen's or mechanics' lien can be found at O.C.G.A. sec136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 111, 395 S.E.2d at 332.
Id. (citing O.C.G.A. §§ 9-9-82, -83 (1982)).
Id., 395 S.E.2d at 333.
Id.

140. Id.; see also Bartlett v. Dimension Designs, Ltd., 195 Ga. App. 845, 395 S.E.2d 64
(1990). Bartlett, while decided under the old Georgia Arbitration Code for Construction
Contracts, states that any arbitral award should be "upheld unless it is completely irrational
or it constitutes a manifest disregard of the law." Id. at 848, 395 S.E.2d at 67. The court also

noted that
"[a]rbitrators are not obliged to apply strict rules of law in the matter at hand,
when they act within the scope of their authority, unless the parties require to
adhere to such rules. In fact, it is stated that they may disregard the traditional
rules of law. Accordingly, as a general rule, arbitrators are free to apply broad

principles of justice and good conscience, and decide according to their concept or
notion of justice. They are still obliged, however, to be guided by the basic agreement of the parties."
Id., 395 S.E.2d at 66 (quoting 6 C.J.S. Arbitration § 70 (1975)).
141. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361 (Supp. 1991).

142. Not all states employ this procedure. Mechanics' or materialmen's liens in Texas
operate as a writ of garnishment and appropriate money from the hands of the owner. See

Lonergan v. San Antonio Loan & Trust Co., 104 S.W. 1061 (Tex. 1907).
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tion 44-14-361.1(a).14 3 As noted in last year's survey, because these statutory liens are in derogation of the common law and often require innocent
parties to pay the debt secured by the lien, the Georgia Court of Appeals
strictly construes the provisions of the Georgia Code against lien claimants.1 4 Accordingly, Georgia courts tend to place materialmen's and
mechanics' lien claims under a magnifying glass in an attempt to avoid
the lien. The areas that appear to cause the greatest trouble for contractors seeking to file liens are the requirements that a claim of lien be filed
within three months of completion of the work, and that notice of the
claim be provided within twelve months of completion of the work. " ,
A.

Timely Filing Difficulties

As noted above, the two critical filing periods are the three month statutory period for filing notice of the lien and the twelve month deadline
for filing of claim and notice of claim. During the survey period, the Georgia courts had an opportunity to address both these periods. In L & W
Supply Corp. v. Whaley Construction Co., 14 defendant, a general contractor, subcontracted with defendant Southeastern Custom Services
("Southeastern") to install sheet rock ,for two separate construction
projects. Southeastern purchased sheet rock materials on an open account
from L & W Supply ("L & W"). When Southeastern failed to pay L & W,
the supplier filed a claim of lien against the property of both projects.
Whaley filed discharge bonds, thus releasing the real property from the
14 7
liens.

L & W filed suit to recover on the bonds. Whaley answered, contending
that the liens were insufficient as a matter of law because they failed to
143. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.1 (Supp. 1991).

144. Brian J. Morrissey & R. Kyle Woods, Construction Law, 42 MERcFR L. Rnv, 25, 39
(1990). See Star Mfg. Co. v. Edenfield, 191 Ga. App. 665, 382 S.E.2d 706 (1989); Dixie Concrete Servs. v. Life Ins. Co., 174 Ga. App. 866, 331 S.E.2d 889 (1985).
145. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.1(a)(2),(3) (Supp. 1991). This code section states in pertinent
part that
[tihe commencement of an action for recovery of the amount of [the lien claimant's] claim [shall be initiated] within 12 months from the time the same shall
become due. In addition, within 14 days after filing such action, the party claiming
the lien shall file a notice with the clerk of the superior court of the county

wherein the subject lien was filed.

Id. § 44-14-361.1(a)(3). This is entirely separate from the requirement that a record of a

claim of lien be filed within three months after the completion of the work as stated in
O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.1(a)(2).
146. 197 Ga. App. 680, 399 S.E.2d 272 (1990). The Georgia Court of Appeals clearly
established when the clock begins to run on both the three and twelve month statutory
periods, Id. at 681, 399 S.E.2d at 273 (citing Chamlee Lumber Co. v. Crichton, 136 Ga. 391,
71 S.E. 673 (1911)).
147. Id. at 680, 399 S.E.2d at 272.
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specify the date the claims became due. The trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of Whaley, and L & W appealed.1 48 The court of appeals reversed. 4 L & W's difficulty arose when it claimed that the last
date on which it delivered material to each project was August 16, 1988
and September 21, 1988 respectively. These dates were at odds with the
technical requirement that the claim state when it was due. The court of

appeals found L & W's allegations sufficient, stating that "the supplier
did specify the date the claim was due; it was by its statement [of] the
last date material was delivered. The date specified was, for legal purposes, the equivalent of the due date." 1 0 This is in accord with the Georgia Supreme Court's earlier holding that as long as a lien is filed and suit
is commenced on time, the lien is effective against the property owner
regardless of technical omissions by the lienholder.'15 In conclusion, the
court noted that
[slupplier L & W Supply Corporation's stating the specific rather than
the generic did not deviate from the requirements of the Code so as to
render its lien claim defective and unenforceable. The supplier complied
with the requirements for valid liens
when it stated the date materials
55
were last delivered to each project.M
The Georgia Court of Appeals, in a recent case, contemplated the
timely nature of the three month filing period. In Womack Industries,
Inc. v. B & A Equipment Co.,"' 8 the court of appeals held against a
lienholder because of the lienholder's failure to file notice of claim within
three months of the supply of labor or materials as opposed to the end of
the contract.' " B & A Equipment ("B & A"), a subcontractor for installation of a water system, storm drains, and sewers on a Womack Industries
("Womack") project, declared the work substantially complete on Decem148. Id. at 680-81, 399 S.E.2d at 272. Default judgment was also entered against defendants Swain and Drury. Id. at 681 n.1, 399 S.E.2d at 272 n.1. 149. Id. at 683, 399 S.E.2d at 274.
150. Id. at 681-82, 399 S.E.2d at 273. This conclusion makes sense because of Georgia's
use of notice pleading.
151. Id. at 682, 399 S.E.2d at 274 (citing J.H. Morris Bldg. Supplies v. Brown, 245 Ga.
178, 264 S.E.2d 9 (1980)).
152. Id. at 683, 399 S.E.2d at 274. Judges Pope and Bank dissented, stating that the
summary judgment should be upheld because of L & W's failure to comply strictly with the
materialmen's lien statute. Id. at 683-84, 399 S.E.2d at 274-75 (Pope & Bank, JJ., dissenting). This result seems a trifle harsh in light of the notice pleading concept that predominates in Georgia and the minor difference in the language utilized for the filing of the claim
which otherwise would have been proper.
153. 199 Ga. App. 660, 405 S.E.2d 880 (1991).
154. Id. at 662, 405 S.E.2d at 882.
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ber 15, 1987. The work was completely finished on February 27, 1988. B
& A filed its lien on July 19, 1988.155
Normally, this would make the filing of the lien untimely and void because of the three month deadline period. B & A contended, however,
that it returned to the Womack project area to remove trash from storm
drains and to turn on several valves that had apparently been left sealed.
B & A contended that this constituted work under the contract so that
completion of the work did not take place before April 21, 1988. Accordingly, the filing of the lien was timely and valid.1 6
The court of appeals firmly rejected this notion observing that
"[a]ccording to B & A's position, no contract would be 'complete' until
the contractor ran out of items to wonder about and check.' 51 The court
also noted:
The evidence in this case demands a conclusion that the work was completed and the water was in fact turned on by February 27, well before

B & A's employees went back to the site on April 21 to see if they had
turned on the water. The trial court erred in failing to direct a verdict for
Womack Industries.'
Courts continue to enforce rigorously the twelve month filing of claim
and notice requirement set out in O.C.G.A. section 44-14-361.1(3).1 59 For
example, in Eurostyle, Inc. v. Jones, 00 the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment against a lienholder because of failure to file
within twelve months."" Eurostyle, Inc. ("Eurostyle") contracted with
Jones to install cabinets in the Jones' home. When the Jones refused to
pay in full because of alleged defects in the cabinets, Eurostyle filed a lien
against the property. On August 14, 1989, Eurostyle commenced an action
to enforce the lien. However, Eurostyle did not file notice of commencement of suit. The Jones' counterclaim sought damages for slander of
title. 1

2

Eurostyle's failure to file a notice of claim within the statutory twelve
month period was a fatal flaw in the claim and, therefore, their lien was
155. Id. at 660, 405 S.E. 2d at 881.
156. Id. at 660-61, 405 S.E.2d at 881.

157. Id. at 661, 405 S.E.2d at 882.
158. Id. at 662, 405 S.E.2d at 882; see also Troup Enters. v. Mitchell, Carrington & Rayfield Co., 199 Ga. App. 173, 404 S.E.2d 337 (1991) (jury question as to whether a mechanics'
or materialmen's lien, which was filed before the absolute completion of all work, was filed
within the three month statutory period).
159. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.1 (Supp. 1991). See Opportunities Industrialization Center,
Inc. v. T & B-Scottdale Contractors, 26 Bankr. 394 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1983).
160. 197 Ga. App. 188, 397 S.E.2d 620 (1990).
161. Id. at 188, 397 S.E.2d at 621.

162. Id.
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void and unenforceable."' 8 The court of appeals affirmed summary judgment against the Jones for their claim of slander of title because "the
to enforce the lien were considered privileged
filing of the lien and action
'
under O.C.G.A. § 51_5_8. 164
An intervening bankruptcy that disrupts the claim process provides an
exception to the rule that requires filing within twelve months.", In Galbreath v. Vondenkamp,166 the owners of real property contracted for the
construction of a residence. The contractor engaged Galbreath, a materialman, to furnish labor and materials for heating, air conditioning, and
electrical wiring of the residence. Galbreath completed his work on November 15, 1986. When the contractor failed to pay him, Galbreath filed
his claim of lien on December 29, 1986. He filed suit on September 9,
1987. On June 8, 1988, appellant received notice that the contractor had
filed bankruptcy. Galbreath then filed a proof of claim in the bankruptcy
proceeding for the amount of the debt. He filed against Vondenkamp on
January 6, 1989 to enforce the lien against the property. The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of Vondenkamp because Galbreath
failed to file notice within the twelve month period.167 The couit of appeals reversed the order granting summary judgment, and remanded the
case for determination of whether the notice requirement had been satisfied. 166 The court relied on O.C.G.A. section 44-14-361.1(a)(4) in stating:
[i]f, after a subcontractor files an action against a contractor, no judgment can be obtained against the contractor because of his adjudication
in bankruptcy, the subcontractor does not have to obtain a judgment
against the contractor as a prerequisite to enforcing his lien but may enforce the lien directly against the property in an action against the owner
of the property, if filed within twelve months from the time the lien becomes due.'"
The court endorsed its previous holdings, stating that "'[aln action to
enforce the lien against the owner need not be instituted within the
twelve-month statutory period if a claim has been filed by the materialmen in the contractor's bankruptcy proceedings during that time.' ",s
The court of appeals further endorsed this exception by holding that
failure to file notice of prior suit against a bankrupt contractor did not
163. Id.

164. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 51-5-8 (1982)).
165. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.1(a)(4) (Supp. 1991).
166. 197 Ga. App. 284, 398 S.E.2d 278 (1990).
167. Id. at 284, 398 S.E.2d at 278-79.

168. Id. at 285, 398 S.E.2d at 280.
169. Id. at 284-865, 398 S.E.2d at 279 (citing O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.1(a)(4) (Supp. 1991)).
170. Id. at 285, 398 S.E.2d at 279 (quoting Newton Lumber v. Crumbley, 161 Ga. App.

741, 742, 290 S.E.2d 114, 115 (1982)).
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extinguish the lien against the homeowners because no final judgment
could be obtained against the contractor.17 1 In Duncan Wholesale, Inc. v.
Palmer,17 ' Duncan Wholesale, Inc. ("Duncan Wholesale") supplied
materials to the contractor Ernest and Gail Palmer engaged to construct
a house on their property. On May 3, 1988, Duncan Wholesale filed a
materialmen's lien on the Palmer property. Duncan Wholesale alleged
that it last delivered materials to the contractor on March 11, 1988, and
1 78
that it had not been paid during the intervening period.

Duncan Wholesale filed suit on open account against the contractor on
January 16, 1989, but the contractor did not file notice as required by
statute. 74 This suit never reached fruition because the contractor filed for
bankruptcy before trial. On March 9, 1989, Duncan Wholesale filed the
instant lien foreclosure proceedings. The Palmers moved to dismiss the
suit because appellant failed to file the required notice of its action
against the contractor. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss because of Duncan Wholesale's failure to file within the statutory period.17 '
The court of appeals reversed, relying on section 44-14-361.1(a)(4).17 6
B. Evidence
In ElectricalDistributors,Inc. v. Turner ConstructionCo.,1 7 7 the Georgia Court of Appeals held that a supplier who does not maintain a separate account number for each subcontracted project by a particular individual, but can nonetheless prove the exact amount due against a
particular property, can maintain a cause of action under the materialmen's and mechanics' lien statutes. 178 In Turner the owner contracted
with Trans-Con Construction Company ("Trans-Con") to construct a
building to be known as Buckhead Plaza. Trans-Con subcontracted the
electrical portion of the project to Electrical Management, Inc. ("EMI").
EMI then contracted with Electrical Distributors, Inc. ("EDI") for certain electrical and lighting supplies necessary to complete the project. On
May 19, 1987, EDI filed a claim of lien against EMI for materials delivered but not yet paid. Less than a month later, EMI filed a petition for
bankruptcy, and EDI filed suit against the project's owner. Turner, as
171. Duncan Wholesale, Inc. v. Palmer, 198 Ga. App. 255, 256, 401 S.E.2d 291, 292
(1990).

172. 198 Ga. App. 255, 401 S.E.2d 291 (1990).
173. Id. at 255, 401 S.E.2d at 292.
174. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.1(a)(3) (Supp. 1991).

175. 198 Ga. App. at 255, 401 S.E.2d at 292.
176. Id. at 257, 401 S.E.2d at 293.
177. 196 Ga. App. 359, 395 S.E.2d 879 (1990).
178. Id. at 360, 395 S.E.2d at 881.
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successor in interest to Trans-Con, filed a bond discharging EDI's lien
against the owner."'
Six months later EDI instituted an action to foreclose on the lien. EDI
claimed $117,538.58 with interest accruing according to the terms of its
subcontract with EMI. Turner erected three defenses, the execution of a
lien waiver, the "contract price defense," 1 0 and that EDI had intermingled its accounts.1 81 The trial court, ruling on cross-motion for summary
judgment, struck the first two defenses, but granted summary judgment
on "the ground that by failing to maintain separate accounts for each
construction project for which it had supplied materials to EMI, EDI has
waived its lien rights." 8 '
On appeal, EDI admitted that it had assigned only one customer number to EMI for all EMI's jobs in Georgia but contended that "it maintained segregated billings by issuing one invoice for each EMI order, by
describing the project of delivery on each invoice, by requiring EMI to
designate payments to specific invoices and by issuing monthly statements showing which EMI invoices remained unpaid."18
It is well settled that a lienholder who so commingles one potential lien
claim with other potential lien claims "'to necessitate a process of separation by the courts'" may well have waived his claim to any and all liens
involved.1 ' However, that was not the case here, since EDI introduced
specific copies of unpaid invoices for materials and lighting supplies furnished for construction on the Buckhead Plaza project. Further,
EDI's accountant explained that when a payment check was received
from EMI the amount paid was entered against the invoice number designated on the check stub and that, if no invoice number was so designated, then EMI was contacted for direction as to application of the
amount paid. The accountant also explained that invoices were removed
from EMI's account as they were paid and that at the end of each month
a statement
was prepared showing the job number, name and balance
owed. 18'
179. Id. at 359, 395 S.E.2d at 880.
180. Id. The "contract price" defense can be found at O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.1(a)(4) and
(e) (Supp. 1991). The court found the defense inapplicable in this case. 196 Ga. App. at 36465, 395 S.E.2d at 883.
181. 196 Ga. App. at 359, 395 S.E.2d at 880.
182. Id. (citing Artistic Ornamental Iron Co. v. Long, 113 Ga. App. 464, 148 S.E.2d 478

(196$)).
183. Id. at 360, 395 S.E.2d at 880.
184. Id., 395 S.E.2d at 880-81 (quoting Rickman Bros. Lumber Co. v. Martin, 144 Ga.
App. 39, 40, 240 S.E.2d 308, 308 (1977)).
185. Id., 395 S.E.2d at 881.
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These facts provided sufficient evidence for the court to hold in favor of
EDI.186

In an interesting case, the court of appeals established a rebuttable presumption that materials delivered to the job site were received and used
by the contractor to the benefit of the defendant.1 87 In Wiliiamscraft Development, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co.,1" a materialman brought suit to
foreclose on a lien filed against property owned by defendant, Williamscraft Development, Inc. The lien covered materials delivered to the contractor defendant hired to make improvements on defendant's property.1"' At trial, defendant presented evidence that the materials were
"never delivered to the job site owned by defendant, or, at least, were
delivered on or before August 1, 1985."190 This allegation, if proved, made
the filing of the claim untimely and entitled the defendant to set aside
the trial court verdict. 91
Plaintiff presented ample evidence, including the testimony of the
owner of an independent trucking company, which corroborated plaintiff's claim that the materials had been picked up at his place of business
and delivered to defendant's job site. To support this claim, the owner of
the trucking company produced invoices with his employee's initials on
them that indicated that his employees had delivered the materials. Additionally, at least one of the invoices contained the signature of defendant's job site supervisor indicating receipt of the materials. 192 Defendant
presented testimony that after August 1, 1985 "the contractor was not
involved in any work on the job site that would have required the materials in question."I s While this represented conflicting evidence, the court,
presented with a jury verdict, was bound to "construe the evidence in the
light most favorable to the verdict."1 9 ' Accordingly, the verdict stood. 1 "5
To aid in questions of this sort, the court stated that "invoices showing
the materials were shipped to the contractor for use at the defendant's
job site created a rebuttable presumption that materials were received
and used by the contractor for the benefit of the defendant."' " This pre186. Id.
187. A related claim can be found in Electrical Distrib. Inc. v. Turner Constr. Co., 196
Ga. App. 359, 395 S.E.2d 879 (1990).
188. 196 Ga. App. 703, 397 S.E.2d 122 (1990).

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
(1976)).

Id. at 703, 397 S.E.2d at 123.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 704, 397 S.E.2d at 124.
Id.
Id. at 705, 397 S.E.2d at 124.
Id., 397 S.E.2d at 125.
Id. at 704, 397 S.E.2d at 124 (citing Bankstone v. Smith, 236 Ga. 92, 222 S.E.2d 375

1991]

CONSTRUCTION LAW

sumption highlights the need for accurate record keeping and procedures
to insure written -verification that the contractor or project director received the materials.
C. Limitations on Damages
Generally, a materialman is allowed to recover from the property owner
the value of the labor and materials he has furnished in the event that
the contractor does not pay him for services. The Georgia Court of Appeals limited a lienholder's recovery in F.S. Associates v. McMichael's
Construction Co. 179 In F.S. Associates, McMichael's Construction Company ("McMichael's") brought an action against the landlord of a tenant
who failed to pay the contractor for its labors. Jerry Willard, a
restauranteur, entered into a lease with F.S. Associates to operate a restaurant in the second-largest space in the Hunting Creek Plaza shopping
center. As part of the terms of the contract, the landlord granted the tenant $59,400 in construction and rebuilding allowance to make the space
suitable for his needs. Subsequently, Willard entered into a contract with
McMichael's to make the improvements needed for the restaurant in
Hunting Creek Plaza. Pursuant to the lease agreement, the landlord paid
the tenant his entire construction allowance, and the tenant passed on
this amount to McMichael's. This left an outstanding balance of over
$125,000 on the construction contract. McMichael's brought suit against
the landlord for the remainder of the contract price when he was unable
to obtain the monies from Willard. McMichael's alleged that he was due
the monies under the lienholder statutes, or on the basis of the equitable
theories of quantum meruit or unjust enrichment. 19 8
The court of appeals disagreed on both counts. First, Judge Pope noted
that "although the landlord consented to improvements made in excess of
the allowance, it cannot be said that the landlord became a party to the
contract for any improvements exceeding that amount."1'1 The court discussed the fact that consent to improvements were common in these lease
situations, as were building allowances, "but mere consent to improvements does not mean that the landlord approves the contract between
tenant and the contractor in such a manner as to make the property subject to the contractor's lien.'' 0° The court also noted that while a contrary
rule may apply in other jurisdictions, these other jurisdictions "unlike
Georgia, have construed their respective materialmen's lien laws liberally
197. 197 Ga. App. 705, 399 S.E.2d 479 (1990).
198. Id. at 705-06, 399 S.E.2d at 480.
199. Id. at 706, 399 S.E.2d at 480.
200. Id. (citing Nunley Contracting Co. v. Four Taylors, 192 Ga. App. 253, 384 S.E.2d
216 (1989)).
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to protect the interest of the materialmen." 20 1 Accordingly, the materialmen's claim for relief from the landlord was denied.' 2
The Georgia Court of Appeals also limited materialmen to the statutory basis of recovery and denied their claim for recovery on the quantum
meruit theory. The court stated, "'Under Georgia law, a materialman or
subcontractor may not recover against an owner or general contractor
with whom it has no contractual relationship, based on the theory of unjust enrichment or implied contract; rather, it is limited to the statutory
remedies provided by Georgia's lien statute.' ,,S
The court's holding in F.S. Associates makes clear that a lienholder is
limited in claims against a landlord, at least in a commercial setting, to
the amount of leasehold improvements granted in the lease agreement
between the tenant and the landlord. This rule will make a crucial difference in the way contractors and suppliers structure transactions in order
to maximize the protection of their interests in commercial leasing
situations.
VI.

A.

SURETY AND GUARANTOR ISSUES

Duty to Defend

In Batson-Cook Co. v. Aetna Insurance Co.,2 °" plaintiff, Batson-Cook
Company ("Batson-Cook"), sued defendants, Aetna Insurance Company
and Fireman's Fund Insurance Company, for failing to provide a defense
in two lawsuits. A Florida developer retained Batson-Cook to provide
construction management services on a project. The comprehensive general liability insurance policy from Aetna listed Batson-Cook as an additional insured, and a similar policy issued by Fireman's Fund listed it as a
named insured.2°
One of the contractors on the project sued Batson-Cook in a Florida
federal district court, and later, another contractor brought suit in a Florida state court. Both Aetna and Fireman's Fund denied that the allegations in the two lawsuits came within the scope of the policies' respective
coverages. The trial court entered summary judgments in favor of Aetna
and Fireman's Fund on the coverage questions, and Batson-Cook
2 6
appealed.
201. Id. at 707, 399 S.E.2d at 481 (citation omitted).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 706, 399 S.E.2d at 481 (quoting MCC Powers v. Ford Motor Co., 184 Ga. App.
487, 488, 361 S.E.2d 716, 717 (1987)) (citations omitted). Presiding Judges Deen and McMurray filed a dissent. Id. at 708, 399 S.E.2d at 482 (Deen & McMurray, P.J.J., dissenting).
204. 200 Ga. App. 571, 409 S.E.2d 41 (1991).
205. Id. at 571-72, 409 S.E.2d at 42.
206. Id.
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The federal action contained three counts alleging negligent performance of Batson-Cook's duties as supervisor of the project. The breach of
duties resulted in lost profits, increased overhead, cost of labor, materials
and tools, increased insurance expenses, loss of use of the equipment, and
other job costs. 0 7 The court found that the federal suit did not allege any
occurrence of property damage as contemplated by the terms of the policies and that there was not a loss as to any tangible property.' 8
The Florida state action alleged that Batson-Cook directed others to
use and move certain equipment and materials of a contractor and that
such use damaged the equipment. The court found that, while such allegations were sufficient to show property damage covered by the policy,
there was no duty to defend because the damage alleged was specifically
excluded by the terms of both policies under a professional services exclusion, specifically, in the provision pertaining to supervisory, inspection, or
engineering services.20
B. Public Works Bonds
In Sunderland v. Vertex Associates,'10 the trial court dismissed plaintiff's claim against a payment bond issued by American Insurance Company on behalf of Vertex Associates ("Vertex"). Vertex was the general
contractor on an elementary school project. Vertex' subcontractors on the
project contracted with Sunderland for certain work. When the subcontractor with whom Sunderland had direct privity defaulted, Sunderland
filed a claim against Vertex for its own services and claims of its subcontractors. The trial court found -that Sunderland had no standing to assert
the claims of its subcontractors, but awarded it a judgment on its own
claims.2'
Since the project was a public work, the bond statute required the general contractor to place a bond for payment of the use of laborers, materialmen, and subcontractors. The court noted that while lien statutes and
bond statutes served the similar purposes of providing protection for
those doing work when payment is not passed on to them, there are also
differences. 1 Generally, the courts construe lien statutes strictly, while
bond statutes are liberally construed in order to protect those who furnish work on public projects.21 Furthermore, a lien is a statutory crea207. Id. at 572-73, 409 S.E.2d at -.
208. Id. at 573, 409 S.E.2d at 209. Id. 573-74, 409 S.E.2d at -.
210. 199 Ga. App. 278, 404 S.E.2d 574 (1991).
211. Id. at 279, 404 S.E.2d at 575.
212. Id. at 279-80, 404 S.E.2d at 575.
213. Id. at 280, 404 S.E.2d at 575 (citing Ingalls Iron Works Co. v. Standard Accident
Ins. Co., 104 Ga. App. 454, 130 S.E.2d 606 (1963)).
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ture, while a bond is based in contract, even though the contract is required by law.2 1 4 Formerly, under the lien statute, a supplier of materials
or labor to a subcontractor could not acquire a lien against the owner of
the property, even though the supplier could always assert a claim under
the bond statute.2"1 The court of appeals further found that, under Georgia's bond statute, the definition of "subcontractor" was not limited only
to those having privity of contract with the prime contractor.2 16 Accordingly, Sunderland had a right to sue upon the bond, and the court extended this right to include all suppliers of materials and labor, the provision of which allowed Sunderland to fulfill its subcontract obligations. 217
C. Joint and Several Obligations of Guarantors
In Floyd Davis Sales, Inc. v. Central Mortgage Corp.,218 plaintiff operated a door and trim company. Plaintiff delivered goods to Walter Lewis
and Associates for use in improvement of real property, payment for
which defendant guaranteed. Plaintiff sued defendant on the guaranty,
whereupon defendant moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for failure to
join indispensable parties, i.e. Walter Lewis and Associates, the principal,
and Walter Lewis, individually, an additional guarantor.2 1' Plaintiff appealed the trial court's grant of defendant's motion to dismiss.2 20 Defendant argubd that the indispensable parties were joint obligors who must
necessarily be joined in the lawsuit. 21 Plaintiff argued that sureties, including guarantors, are jointly and severally liable with their principal
unless the contract provides otherwise. The court concluded that, absent any contractual language to the contrary, the
alleged indispensable
222
parties were severally liable with the defendant.
Defendants further argued that defendant and Walter Lewis, individually, were jointly obligated, but not severally obligated, so that the language of O.C.G.A. section 10-7-124 would not apply because it did not
214. Id.
215. Id.

216. Id. O.C.G.A. § 36-82-100(2) (1987) provides: "As used in this article, the term:
...(2) 'Subcontractors' includes but is not limited to those having privity of contract with

the prime contractor." Id. § 36-82-100(2).
217. 199 Ga. App. at 281-82, 404 S.E.2d at 576-77.
218. 197 Ga. App. 532, 398 S.E.2d 820 (1990).
219. Id. at 532, 398 S.E.2d at 821.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 533, 398 S.E.2d at 821. O.C.G.A. § 10-7-1 (1989) provides in part "[s]ureties,

including those formerly called guarantors, are jointly and severally liable with their principal unless the contract provides otherwise." Id. § 10-7-1.
223.
224.

197 Ga. App. at 533, 398 S.E.2d at 821.
O.C.G.A. § 10-7-1 (1989).
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specifically include the relationship between cosureties.'2 2 The court rejected this argument, holding that these cosureties made separate
promises to pay in separate instruments; thus, the reciprocal rights and
liabilities between the cosureties arose from their status as such, and not
from any agreement between them. 2a As a result, any right to contribution and indemnity or to the benefit of any security in the hands of the
other would be founded not upon contract, but upon general considerations of justice and equity. 2 '

225. 197 Ga. App. at 533, 398 S.E.2d at 821.
226. Id., 398 S.E.2d at 822.
227. Id.

